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sensing paradigm presents significant security challenges and risks. In this paper, we present an overview of these
issues as well as solutions that can be considered to address them. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents architectural models and applications for USNs. In section 3 we discuss security issues for
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs). Section 4 presents solutions to secure USNs. In section 5 we present open
challenges. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Architectures and Applications of Ubiquitous Sensor Networks
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs) are sensor networks that make use of Internet-connected devices to serve as
a sensing platform to collect data of interest3. Usually these devices are owned (or are in custody) by common
citizens; however USNs can be deployed by using devices owned by the government as well as private-sector
companies. USNs differ in various aspects with respect to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) (table 1). The most
important differences among these two classes of networks are that devices in USNs are more powerful than their
counterparts in WSNs, the communication between devices in USNs depends on infrastructure-based networks and
the Internet, and typically there is human involvement in the collection of data. The typical hardware architecture of
USNs consists of the following components3:
• Sensors: The major functionality of these components of the architecture is to collect data. Sensor software and
middleware technologies collect data from the hardware sensors and transfer it to the first-level integrators. Sensors
are wired to the first-level integrator devices, or they may be connected via personal area networks such as
Table 1. A comparison of features of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs).

Features
Computational
Capabilities

Communication	
  
Infrastructure

Communication	
  
Security

Wireless	
  Sensor	
  Networks
Devices	
  are	
  battery-‐powered	
  and	
  designed	
  
for	
  low-‐power	
  consumption.	
  Devices	
  are	
  
limited	
  in	
  computational	
  power,	
  memory	
  and	
  
communication.	
  WSNs	
  are	
  left	
  unattended	
  
for	
  a	
  long	
  period	
  of	
  time.	
  Make	
  use	
  of	
  
custom-‐made	
  devices.
Devices	
  must	
  collaborate	
  to	
  perform	
  ad-‐hoc	
  
network	
  routing	
  and	
  maintenance.
Single	
  network	
  interface	
  with	
  low-‐power	
  
protocols	
  (e.g.,	
  802.15.4)	
  is	
  used.
Cross-‐layer	
  design	
  for	
  security	
  is	
  needed	
  due	
  
to	
  low	
  power	
  and	
  limited	
  computational	
  
capabilities.

Network	
  
Management

Single	
  entity	
  manages	
  and	
  controls	
  the	
  WSN.	
  
Devices	
  are	
  designed	
  and	
  deployed	
  for	
  a	
  
single	
  purpose.	
  Devices	
  participate	
  in	
  a	
  single	
  
WSN	
  at	
  a	
  time.

Network	
  
Maintenance

Performed	
  by	
  the	
  entity	
  that	
  owns	
  the	
  WSN.	
  
Network	
  can	
  be	
  costly	
  to	
  deploy	
  and	
  
maintain.

Scalability

Potentially	
  thousands	
  of	
  devices	
  in	
  a	
  single	
  
system.

Ubiquitous	
  Sensor	
  Networks
Devices	
  with	
  GHz	
  multi-‐core	
  processors	
  and	
  
memory	
  in	
  the	
  GB	
  range	
  are	
  typical.	
  Devices	
  have	
  
rechargeable	
  batteries	
  or	
  they	
  are	
  connected	
  to	
  a	
  
reliable	
  power	
  source.	
  Make	
  use	
  of	
  Commercial	
  
Off-‐The-‐Shelf	
  (COTS)	
  devices,	
  sensors	
  and	
  
operating	
  systems.
Devices	
  may	
  have	
  multiple	
  network	
  interfaces,	
  
with	
  infrastructure-‐based	
  networks	
  (e.g.	
  ISPs,	
  
cellular	
  networks)	
  and	
  end-‐to-‐end	
  TCP/IP	
  
communication.
Use	
  of	
  standard	
  protocols	
  such	
  as	
  Transport	
  
Layer	
  Security	
  (TLS)	
  and	
  common	
  cryptographic	
  
algorithms/protocols	
  (e.g.,	
  AES,	
  RC4,	
  elliptic	
  
curve)	
  provide	
  end-‐to-‐end	
  security.	
  Assumes	
  
reliable	
  communication	
  by	
  Internet	
  Service	
  
Providers	
  (ISPs).
Multiple	
  entities	
  participate	
  in	
  the	
  management	
  
of	
  the	
  USN	
  with	
  multiple	
  roles.	
  Data	
  collection	
  
tasks	
  may	
  be	
  issued	
  by	
  more	
  than	
  one	
  entity	
  and	
  
devices	
  can	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  address	
  many	
  purposes.	
  	
  
Devices	
  may	
  participate	
  in	
  more	
  than	
  one	
  USN	
  
simultaneously.
Performed	
  by	
  the	
  custodians	
  of	
  data	
  collection	
  
devices	
  and	
  entities	
  collecting	
  data.	
  Can	
  be	
  
potentially	
  cheap	
  to	
  maintain.	
  May	
  depend	
  on	
  
participation	
  by	
  users/custodians	
  to	
  accomplish	
  
the	
  goals	
  of	
  the	
  USN.
Potentially	
  billions	
  of	
  devices	
  in	
  a	
  single	
  system.
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Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), 802.15.4 (Zigbee) or some other wireless Local Area Network (LAN)
technology.
• First-level integrators: The roles of first-level integrators are to perform initial data verification, aggregation
and basic analysis (e.g., feature extraction) on the data collected by sensors. Any device that supports IP-based
communication can serve as a first-level integrator. Examples include smartphones and Internet-connected devices.
• Data transport: In USNs, data transport is provided by any IP-based communication network that enables the
end-to-end transfer of data from the first-level integrators to the second-level integrators. The data transport role is
performed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
• Second-level integrators: These components collect and store data sent from first-level integrators. They also
provide analytics services and feedback to first-level integrator devices and to external entities. Second-level
integrators are implemented by servers and/or cloud-based services.
USNs are currently deployed in several application fields, including environmental monitoring, entertainment,
transportation, security, and healthcare. These applications can be grouped into four major categories: (1) Locationbased systems (LBS); (2) Community-based sensing systems (CBS); (3) Human-centric sensing systems (HCS); (4)
hybrid systems. Available since the late 1990’s, LBS systems make use of location sensors to receive/collect
geotagged data4,5. CBS systems (also known as crowdsensing) track variables of interest for communities (e.g.,
neighborhoods, cities, citizen associations, leisure/gaming associations, government). Such variables may include
pollution, noise, state and congestion of streets, among others6,55-57. CBS can be classified as participatory or
opportunistic7. HCS systems track human-related variables such as physiological variables with the goal of
improving the wellbeing of individuals. Some examples of HCS are security and safety systems (e.g., home security,
human-fall detection), Mobile health (M-Health) and personal health systems (e.g., fitness tracking) 8,58. Finally,
hybrid systems incorporate characteristics of these three previous groups. Examples in this last group include games
such as Pokemon GO 59.
3. Security Issues in Ubiquitous Sensor Networks
Since USN devices are more powerful than their WSN counterparts and USN integrator devices make use of
protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish end-to-end secure communication channels between
integrators over the Internet, many of the WSN security issues related to the establishment of secure channels (e.g.,
key distribution, implementation of cryptographic protocols in resource-constrained devices) and network
maintenance (e.g., ad-hoc routing) are non-existent in USNs. Consequently, given the features of USNs presented in
table 1, we classify the security issues for USNs into two major categories: (1) data integrity; (2) system availability.
3.1. Data Integrity
In USNs, users may have control over several sensors and data collecting devices9. Their direct access to these
components could be utilized to launch spoofing attacks by submitting false, incorrect, or fake data10. Similarly, a
second type of spoofing attack on the sensors could be performed by tampering and modifying the physical
environment (i.e., for a temperature sensor, this type of attack would increase the room temperature on purpose). In
this case, although the sensor’s readings are correct, the sensed data are generated from fake or tampered
environments 11. In human-centric sensing systems, including m-Health and fitness tracking systems, data integrity
is critical. M-Health applications collect health-related data and provide feedback that could include the operation of
intrusive actions at a patient’s body automatically (e.g., deliver medication). In such cases, the violation of data
integrity can have serious, life-threatening consequences. This aspect in human-centric USNs raises another major
security concern which is the authentication of sensors and users when performing data collection 12,13.
3.2. System Availability
Since data transport in USNs is provided by ISPs, it is assumed that ISPs provide reliable networks to support the
communication between integrators. Therefore, there are three ways one can launch attacks on system availability in
USNs as follows:
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• Availability at First-level Integrators: In USNs, we identify these attacks as follows: (1) attacking the
communication infrastructure between sensors and the first-level integrator devices by interfering with the
communication media 14,16; (2) attacking and/or depleting the power supply with battery exhaustion attacks 17,18; or
(3) making the operating system unresponsive by exploiting security vulnerabilities of the host operating system19,21.
• Availability at Second-level Integrators: Two major issues arise when managing availability for second-level
integrator devices: (1) elasticity; (2) Denial of Service (DoS). Even though the result of not managing both issues
correctly is the same (no availability), they differ in terms of availability. Elasticity deals with the ability of the
system or the service to satisfy and adapt to workload changes 23, whereas DoS are deliberate attacks to the system
or the service itself by malicious parties 24.
• Attacks on User Participation: USNs require the participation and collaboration from users and custodians to
collect data and enable the system to provide a certain level of Quality of Information (QoI)9,22 to be useful. Attacks
on user participation may include availability attacks at first-level integrators and human aspects that may refrain
users from contributing and collecting data (e.g., lack of motivation to participate, reputation of the USN system). If
users are not willing to participate, the system will not collect data to provide the feedback at the level required by
its stakeholders, resulting on a similar situation as an availability attack on the USN.
4. Securing Ubiquitous Sensor Networks
This section discusses the security solutions that can mitigate the attacks discussed in section 3. The issues along
with their solutions are summarized in table 2.
4.1. Data Integrity
We can prevent eavesdropping and data integrity attacks by protecting communication channels through
encryption from sensors to first-level integrators, and from first-level integrators to second-level integrators.
However, faulty sensor readings and users’ actions such as tampering with sensors (or the environment) are
examples where encryption alone does not help to maintain data integrity in USNs. In this section, we provide
methods available to deal with data integrity.
• Estimation and Filtering: For certain types of USNs such as community-based systems, the management of
errors in the data (e.g., wrong measurements, outliers, faulty sensor readings) assumes that there are enough
participants such that the redundancy (of first-level integrators) along with statistical models can handle errors in the
data at a macro level25,27 without affecting the estimation performed by the system. Examples of techniques for
estimation and filtering of data used in USNs include interpolation techniques such as kridging, Markov Random
Fields, Principal Component Analysis25, clustering, Gaussian Mixture Models26, as well as anomaly detection
algorithms such as unsupervised/supervised machine learning methods (e.g., support vector machines, neural
networks, Bayesian networks) and parametric/non-parametric methods adapted for anomaly detection 27.
• User and Sensor Authentication: Solutions to handle authentication in USNs include the utilization of biometric
methods28,29, smart cards authentication30,31, two-factor authentication methods32,33, and secured brokering hardware
34,36
. The utilization of mobile phone-based biometric authentication methods (e.g., fingerprint sensors, face
recognition) combined with other wearable and/or implantable sensors may provide interesting approaches to handle
user authentication35. The utilization of hardware-based, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)37 can provide
solutions for device authentication, especially since TEEs are currently used in mobile phones as a standard feature
for network device authentication (e.g., International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI)38.
4.2. System Availability
• Availability at First-level Integrators: Avoiding DoS in communication channels between sensors and first-level
integrator devices can be achieved using mechanisms such as frequency hopping, repositioning of sensors,
modification of protocols, and physical layer jamming avoidance techniques (e.g., directional antennas, spread
spectrum, channel diversity)14. In the case of battery exhaustion attacks, methods may include the development of
power-aware operating systems and frameworks 39,40, techniques for assessing power consumption of an application
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or a sensing task before downloaded and installed at a first-level integrator device 41,43, as well as approaches that
detect an abnormal increase in the power consumption at runtime44,46. In the case of detecting operating system
vulnerabilities, the following techniques could be used: (1) static analysis (i.e., analysis of source/compiled code
before execution by using tools such as Metal47); (2) dynamic analysis (i.e., analysis of programs during their
execution to detect and document program errors and vulnerabilities48); (3) formal methods (i.e., use of
mathematical logic and specifications to prove program correctness 49,50). The detection of vulnerabilities is always a
race against the clock, as they must be corrected before they are exploited by attackers. It is possible for a
vulnerability/bug to be undetected for many years 21.
• Availability at Second-level Integrators: To deal with availability at second-level integrators, USN systems
should focus on addressing the problems of elasticity and denial of service, as mentioned in section 3. Given the
possibility of billions of Internet-connected devices performing data collection for USNs, not being able to manage
or cope with different types of workloads will render the system useless. To deal with elasticity in USNs,
approaches such as hybrids between client-server and peer-to-peer architectures3 and cloud-based solutions 60,61 have
been proposed. In the case of DoS, the issue is similar to any other service provided on the Internet, therefore
countermeasures for traditional network infrastructure and cloud-based environments can be used62.
• User Participation: Salim et al.51 identified that the successful, large-scale user participation in USNs consists
Table 2. Security issues and solutions for Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs).

Security	
  Issues
Data	
  
Spoofing
Integrity

Solutions
Estimation	
  and	
  
Filtering
Anomaly	
  
Detection

Authentication

User	
  authentication
Sensor	
  Authentication

System	
  
Availability

Availability	
  at	
  
first-‐level	
  
Integrators

Interference	
  attacks	
  on	
  
communication	
  between	
  
sensors	
  and	
  first-‐level	
  
integrators
Battery	
  exhaustion	
  
attacks
Operating	
  System	
  
(OS)vulnerabilities

Availability	
  at	
  
second-‐level	
  
integrators

Elasticity
Denial	
  of	
  Service

Attacks	
  on	
  user	
  participation

Kridging
Clustering
Gaussian	
  Mixture	
  Models
Clustering
Support	
  Vector	
  Machines
Neural	
  Networks
Bayesian	
  Networks
Statistical	
  methods

Biometric	
  methods
Smart	
  cards	
  authentication
Two-‐factor	
  authentication
Secure	
  brokering	
  hardware
Trusted	
  Execution	
  Environments
Frequency	
  hopping
Sensor	
  repositioning
Protocol	
  modification
Physical	
  layer	
  jamming	
  avoidance
(directional	
  antennas,	
  spread	
  spectrum,	
  channel	
  
diversity)
Power-‐aware	
  Operating	
  Systems
Assessing	
  Power	
  consumption	
  of	
  task	
  before	
  installed
Anomaly	
  detection	
  for	
  power	
  consumption	
  at	
  runtime
Static	
  analysis
Dynamic	
  analysis
Formal	
  methods
Hybrids	
  between	
  client-‐server	
  and	
  P2P	
  architectures
Cloud-‐based	
  solutions
DoS	
  countermeasures	
  for	
  cloud	
  services	
  and	
  
traditional	
  network	
  environments
Incentives
Micropayments
Altruistic	
  incentives
Social	
  incentives
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of five steps, namely (1) identify needs and dilemmas; (2) identify stakeholders; (3) identify incentives; (4) gather
evidence and experience; (5) provide tools and affordance. USN systems must provide benefits to the well-being of
an individual or a community by means of monetary or non-monetary incentives52 as follows:
• Micropayments: these are monetary incentives that pay small fractions of a dollar to users that contribute data to
the USN. Micropayments were developed in the 1990’s during the explosion of the Web as an incentive to sell
online content53 for user-generated content. In the context of USNs, micropayments were first evaluated by Lee
et al.54 by using algorithms for micropayments based on game theory.
• Altruistic incentives: Users participate because of the benefits to the community that a USN can provide.
Common examples include P-Sense6, the Personal Environmental Impact Report (PEIR)55, and NoiseSPY56.
• Social incentives: In this category the incentives are social or human-centric rewards such as increase of
reputation, improved health, or exposure from the interaction with other users with common objectives.
Common examples in this group include e-bird57, fitness application such as Runtastic58 and game such as
Pokemon GO59.
5. Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Sensor Networks
Human intervention, and trust in the devices, tasks, and task issuers are key aspects in the successful deployment
of future USNs. In this context, we identify some of the current challenges that should be addressed to build more
robust and secure USNs. These challenges include: (1) trustworthy tasking; (2) data integrity for human-centric
USNs; (3) privacy.
• Trustworthy Tasking: USNs have been developed under the principle that the sensing task and whoever collects
data are trusted. As such, most of the research in securing USNs assumes that threats are coming from the
custodians of first-level integrator devices (e.g., by submitting fake data), or an external third-party with the goal of
disrupting the USN (e.g., by executing a DoS attack on the USN). However, more research is needed on how to trust
the data collection entity, the sensing task, and the security of the device itself, especially given the utilization of
COTS devices as integrators and sensors. USN devices could be reprogrammed through a sensing task to steal data
or could be used as zombies by botnets to attack external parties63, or the task may create physical harm to the user
(e.g., theft, kidnapping, accidents) 64.
• Data Integrity for Human-centric USNs: In a human-centric USN, a user usually has one type of sensor of each
kind. For instance, a user has one heart rate sensor, one ECG sensor, and one breath depth sensor if using a wearable
such as the Zephyr Bioharness 65, or there might be multiple sensors of one type (e.g., a heart rate sensor on a chest
strap, and another on a smartwatch). Estimation and filtering of variables of interest in addition to redundancy of
sensors/multiple first-level integrators as proposed for community-based USNs cannot be utilized because data in
human-centric systems from a particular user are usually isolated from others due to privacy concerns. New
techniques are needed to authenticate data in these scenarios. In addition, because feedback in human-centric
systems could involve intrusive actions automatically (e.g., deliver medication without user intervention), novel
methods are needed to continuously authenticate the user to ensure the effectiveness of these actions (i.e., some of
these actions can generate life-threatening consequences). These authentication methods must have the following
characteristics:
• Non-repudiation: These methods must guarantee user identity with high assurance.
• Unobtrusive: These methods must authenticate users without explicit user intervention. Continuous
authentication methods that request users to authenticate regularly are unrealistic (i.e., not usable from the
human-computer interaction perspective).
• Power-aware: Many first-level integrators in human-centric USNs are battery-powered, thus continuous
authentication methods that generate high power overhead for a first-level integrator device are not useful.
• Privacy: The ubiquity and use of mobile and Internet-connected devices as first-level integrators present a
tradeoff: on one hand it is desired to collect data as accurately as possible, but on the other hand it is imperative that
we collect or share data in a way that would preserve the privacy of users. Aspects such as context privacy (i.e.,
inference about the actions that could be obtained about users from the sensor data), bystander’s privacy (i.e.,
external people’s privacy that can be affected when collecting data in the USN), data sharing privacy (i.e.,
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controlling to whom a second-level integrator releases sensor data with), as well as ownership of sensor data remain
open, emerging research issues that need further investigation.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We have reviewed some of the threats and solutions in security for ubiquitous sensor networks. Security issues
were grouped into two major categories, namely data integrity and system availability. Although we have discussed
some solutions that can be applied to secure USNs, more research is needed to handle several security issues such as
trustworthy tasking, data integrity for human-centric USNs, as well as privacy. Given the current rate of adoption of
mobile and IoT devices and their utilization in USNs, security will continue to play an important role in the future.
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